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Violence in schools: Expanding the dialogue 
Stephanie Urso Spina 
 
• A new handgun is sold every thirteen seconds in the 
United States.1 
• Every half hour a child is killed or wounded by a 
bullet.2 
• Every six hours in America a child between ten and 
nineteen years old commits suicide with a handgun.3 
• Each day, almost two thousand children, or one child 
every thirteen seconds, is reported as abused or 
neglected.4 
• Three million crimes occur on or near schools every year; 
sixteen thousand per school day, or one every six seconds.5 
• For school-age youth, the chances of being a victim of a 
violent crime are greater than being hurt in a car 
accident.6  
• Between twenty-five and thirty-five thousand murders are 
committed in this country each year—over ten thousand are 
the result of domestic violence.7 
• Homicide is the leading cause of death for African 
American and Latino males under age twenty-five, and the 
second leading cause of death nationally for all youth 
under age twenty-five.8 
• In 1993, more African American children under age nine 
died from gun violence than police officers or American 




• Recent research finds that one-third of urban children 
interviewed had witnessed a violent death10 and almost 
three-quarters knew someone who had been shot.11  
• About three million violent crimes are reported in the 
United States each year.12  
• Every year, 2,000 deaths, 1,412,700 serious injuries, and 
18,000 serious disabilities are known to result from child 
abuse.13  
• A woman is battered every fifteen seconds.14  
• There are, at minimum, 150,000 rapes of women and 
children reported annually in the United States; more than 
400 each day, 17 every hour, or 1 every three-and-a-half 
minutes.  Estimates that include unreported rapes 
conservatively estimate the annual figure to be closer to 
630,000.15  
 These statistics are not offered to sensationalize the 
issues, to obscure the brutality they enumerate, or to numb one 
into hopelessness or apathy, but rather to underscore the 
devastatingly high number of children, teens, parents, families, 
and communities who must live with the reality of what these 
numbers represent in human terms. Yet, while we read and hear 
about rampant rape, robberies, drugs, and shootings, many of us 
have become desensitized to their human dimensions and 
underlying messages. Like much of the general public, social 
scientists, educators, and others who work with youth often have 
great difficulty understanding the lives of disenfranchised 
students. Many of us, in part because we are professionals, have 
not been subject to the powerful subcultures that seduce our 
students with false promises and futile dreams in a world that 
makes their fruition improbable if not impossible. Similarly, 
many of us are unaware of the insidious level of violence that 
is poverty, of the despair and nihilism that is informed, 
shaped, and reproduced by the very fabric of our society—a 
situation that demands that we go beyond simply condemning 
violence and blaming schools.  
Censuring Schools   
Schools have long been the scapegoat16 for society’s ills, 
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while, at the same time, school systems in the inner city are 
hardest hit by the ills of society. This is not meant to absolve 
schools from responsibility nor to underestimate the critical 
value of the school’s role in children’s lives, but to recognize 
the interdependence between schooling and the sociocultural and 
political reality of the society within which schools exist. 
Americans tend to view public schools as agencies of 
socialization as well as education. Public schooling, as we now 
know it, along with imprisoning “juvenile delinquents,” was a 
response to the rapid rise of industrialization and the first 
waves of mass immigration at the end of the nineteenth 
century.17 At that time, the established prototype for all human 
service institutions was the asylum,18 and the paragon of 
progress and productivity was the factory. Schools purposely 
combined the model of the factory with those institutions 
designed to house the sick, the indigent, and convicted 
criminals in order to better assimilate the diverse population19 
into their “proper” places in the hegemonic social order.20 This 
“social efficiency” model lingers today in the design of school 
buildings and curricula as well as in the widespread assumption 
that it is the schools’ responsibility to solve social problems.  
 The endurance of this model and its effects contribute to 
the absurdity that, while schools are supposedly part of the 
solution, our educational model itself fosters practices that 
may themselves be a form of violence.21 Even “normalized” school 
practices intended to improve academic performance may actually 
harm overwhelmingly poor minority students.22 These include 
tracking,23 style of pedagogy, curricular and testing biases, 
and other “literacies of power.”24 For example, Jean Anyon’s 
work demonstrates how textbooks are often microcosms of white, 
middle-class interests and situations even when minority 
characters are featured.25 Yet these alienating texts are the 
bases for learning and evaluation. The National Curriculum 
Standards epitomizes the enforcement of dominant cultural values 
and practices that view difference as a problem to be cured, 
especially in vilified "disordered" or "violent" spaces like 
inner city schools.26 Inconsistent or unfair enforcement of 
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arbitrary or oppressive rules, overcrowded classes, and the 
retention of uncaring or hostile teachers are other ways schools 
harm students.27 Labeling, stereotyping, and similar 
stigmatizing wonts may also promote divisions along racial, 
ethnic, linguistic, and economic lines as well as precipitate 
school-specific violence.28  
 Division by oversimplified, oppositionally constructed 
taxonomies are a common strategy or means of ideological 
control.29 Foucault argues that such “dividing practices” 
objectify the individual by labeling him in oppositional terms 
that reflect societal assessments of intellect, health, and 
criminality (e.g., dangerous/harmless, normal/abnormal, us/them, 
straight/gay, white/black).30 As a nation, we “learn” to use 
such discursive "violence" to simultaneously discount and 
spectacularize violence and victims by virtue of their age, sex, 
color, income, or language. They are devalued by a system that 
manipulates public sentiment via “spin doctors” who employ 
euphemistic doublespeak to divert responsibility from the 
perpetrator to the victim. Politicians thrive on campaigns built 
around the imagery of juvenile and racialized crime. They drive 
the bandwagon that demonizes youth,31 that makes a spectacle of 
students,32 that violates basic human rights. 
 All of these discourses are based on surveillance 
techniques and practices that divide students as a group as well 
as individuals. The legacy of social control, not education, 
dominates the agenda of schools. Schools generally respond to an 
upsurge in violence through the use of symbols of control and 
authority. The omnipresence of metal detectors, guards, 
“security” cameras, and the like promote both a relentless 
awareness of possible danger and a false sense of safety. School 
officials claim the huge number of confiscated weapons indicates 
they are reducing violence when, in fact, even the $28 million 
expenditure to install metal detectors in New York City public 
schools in the 1980s has done nothing to curtail the problem33 
and has contributed to the creation of an even more insidious 
gendered form of violence. Jennifer McCormick describes how 
hand-held metal detectors pass over teenage bodies as students 
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are required to stand with their legs apart and their hands 
outstretched.34 She illustrates how this routine becomes 
explicitly sexual when the students are female and male security 
guards are present. One girl McCormick interviewed in a New York 
City public high school describes the experience this way: 
I hate it. I don’t feel right....I have to put my hands out 
(she places her hand on the table in front of us, fingers 
are stretched apart). I have to stand straight for a few 
minutes, legs apart, my hands outstretched in front of me. 
I have to take my bracelets off, take everything out of my 
pockets. It's very uncomfortable, I feel embarrassed 
amongst everybody else. It's not good. It's not a 
productive way to start off school. I hate it. I don't feel 
right. I feel out of my element. In a way they are trying 
to take my shield away because with the scanning, they are 
looking for something I may have concealed....I feel like 
they are trying to know my body....I hear the comments or I 
see the looks from the guards to other girls. And through 
that and through the scanning, they get closer than they 
can ever get in a normal way....I’m sure they’re getting 
off on it....I just don’t like it. I don’t like it. I don’t 
like it.35  
Yet, despite the humiliation and invasiveness of metal detectors 
and electronic scanners, students express the desire for 
security, often enduring psychic and emotional pain in exchange 
for what they believe to be protection from more physical and 
fatal forms of violence. 
 In truth, and contrary to what news reports and political 
propaganda would have us think, schools themselves are 
comparatively safe havens. In 1998, for example, there were 
approximately 20 million middle- and high-school students in the 
United States. Fewer than a dozen of these students killed 
someone at school. Nationally, youth violence comprises only 13 
percent of the violent crime and 8 percent of murders reported 
by the FBI. This is not to downplay the tragedy of these events 
or to minimize the expectation that schools should be 
absolutely, not relatively, safe, but to underscore how 
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disproportionate the level of fear and resources surrounding 
this “epidemic” of “violence in schools” is when viewed in light 
of the larger picture.  
 Consider, for example, a 1994 national survey of hospital 
emergency rooms which reported treating a total of 900,000 
injuries resulting from violent crime. These injuries were eight 
times more likely (410,000) to occur in the home and five times 
more likely (246,000) to occur in the workplace than in schools 
(55,000).36 Consider that of the two to three thousand children 
and youths murdered each year, 90 percent are under age twelve 
and 30 percent are aged twelve through seventeen.37 Three out of 
every four are killed by parents or caretakers, not by other 
juveniles. In comparison, forty-two percent of childhood deaths 
are caused by car crashes and other accidents.38 We should not 
ignore the threat to youth from drinking, driving, and 
unprotected sex because it does not provoke national outrage, 
because it does not threaten our collective unconscious, because 
it does not provide emotional jolts on the 6:00 news. Yet, from 
the executive branch to the local level, from The New York Times 
to CNN, shootings by students are what attract attention and 
serve to camouflage far greater acts of violence.  
 The omission of such disturbing data from the discourse on 
violence misleadingly supports those who, like President 
Clinton, assert that today’s grown-ups “confront a younger 
generation desensitized to brutality by its own ‘culture’ of 
violent media and seemingly unable or unwilling to take 
responsibility for their actions."39 Legislation is another ploy 
used to detract attention from adult malfeasance. In 1997, for 
example, the U.S. House of Representatives passed a bill to 
“crack down” on juvenile crime by rewarding states that 
prosecute more underage perpetrators as adults.40 As this volume 
illustrates, it is the dominant adult society, with its elected 
officials casting the most stones, that commits the most crimes 
against the most people and refuses to take responsibility for 
them. It is safer to blame youths who can’t vote and whose 
voices remain unheard.  
 Policy makers reinforce and promote this delusional 
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perspective. For example, the sixth National Education Goal 
called for every school in America to be free of drugs and 
violence by the year 2000.41 The Safe Schools Act of 1994 
allocated $20 million in twenty one-year grants to reinforce 
existing school safety programs. However, there is little if any 
evidence that such violence prevention programs work and some 
have actually worsened the very situation they were implemented 
to improve.42 Rather than increasing security or technology, 
more fundamental issues need to be addressed—issues that lie at 
the very core of our society.   
 American schools, like American cities, are segregated 
racially, politically, and economically. Ethnic and racial 
minorities have always been disproportionately represented in 
the incidence and depiction of violence. It is not a coincidence 
that this is the case when one examines these data in the 
context of social, and cultural factors.  
Socioeconomic Factors 
We are increasingly a nation with sharpening divisions between 
the “haves” and “have-nots.” The top 5 percent of our citizens 
control over 20 percent of the country’s wealth, while the 20 
percent at the bottom of the economic ladder struggle to survive 
on less than 4 percent. The richest 1 percent of households own 
48 percent of the nation’s wealth.43 As of the mid-1990s, the 
income of those in the top 20 percent of U. S. families was more 
than eleven times as much as the bottom 20 percent. During 1997, 
the Census Bureau reported that more than 35.5 million Americans 
lived in poverty, meaning they earned less than $8,183 a year if 
they were single, or $16,400 for a family of four. Another 12 
million had annual earnings 25 percent above the poverty 
threshold.44  
 Even more striking is the stark inequality in the economic 
condition of America’s children.45 At over 20 percent and 
climbing, the child poverty rate in the United States is far 
higher than in other countries (e.g., below 4 percent in Sweden, 
Belgium, Denmark, and Finland)—even relatively poor ones (e.g., 
Ireland has about a 12 percent child poverty rate). The closest 
figures are from Canada and Australia, at about 14 percent, 
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which, not insignificantly, also accompany rates of lethal 
violence comparatively higher than Europe, though still 
substantially lower than the United States.46 In 1976, about 28 
percent of American children lived in families with income less 
than half the poverty level. By 1994, 44 percent did, including 
well over half of poor black children.47 On any given night, 
approximately 200,000 children are homeless. Children under 
three are consistently worse off than older children and far 
worse off in the United States than in any other country. (For 
example, the U.S. poverty rate for the youngest children is 
almost 50 percent higher than the next highest rates in Britain 
and Canada and about three times as high as Germany, four times 
as high as France and Sweden, and almost eleven times as high as 
the Netherlands.48 Nor, despite pointed political posturing, 
does this represent a lack of effort on the part of the parental 
poor. Sixty percent of all poor children under the age of three 
have at least one employed parent. This includes 70 percent of 
poor white children, 60 percent of poor Hispanic children, and 
50 percent of poor black children.49 More than 40 percent of 
single mothers with a child under the age of three work full- or 
part-time. But these jobs do not provide a living wage and are 
further limited by a lack of benefits and available community 
support services such as child and health care. Repeated 
failures to pass federal initiatives that would support the 
needs and rights of children, while spending tax dollars on 
incentives to help the rich get richer or to support ludicrous 
and vindictive personal attacks against one’s political 
opponents, starkly dramatizes the U.S. government’s neglect of 
its neediest citizens.50  
 Virtually every other post industrial nation provides some 
form of child care for three- to five-year-olds as well as paid 
leaves for parents.51 The United States is the only 
postindustrial nation without a national health system to 
deliver accessible, high quality preventive and prenatal health 
care. Infant mortality rates in the United States have been 
steadily increasing over the past thirty years. The United 
States now has the fourth highest infant mortality rate of all 
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industrialized countries (ranking below all except Greece, 
Portugal, and Turkey).52  
 The situation is exacerbated by basic principles of our 
Darwinian market economy. Capitalist values of avarice and 
egocentricity undermine social cohesion by promoting individual 
competition and consumption over community values and productive 
work. In market societies, strong labor movements or truly 
democratic political representation are nonexistent. People who 
need it most are deprived of the conceptual framework, the 
collective consciousness, the cultural capital53 to challenge 
the forces of violence.54  
 Thirty years ago, one in five city residents lived below 
poverty level. Ten years ago it was more than one-third and 
growing.55 By 1991, the population of major U.S. cities averaged 
70 percent racial ethnic minorities and over 43 percent of all 
American poor, including 80 percent of all African American 
poor.56 Yet, adjusting for inflation, federal aid to cities was 
cut 60 percent between 1980 and 1992.57 The mass exodus of 
businesses from cities leaves urban areas with only a minimal 
number of highly stratified low-wage, temporary jobs without 
benefits and highly technological top-level professional jobs 
accessible only to an elite population.58  
Politics, Race, and Class 
The inequities noted in the previous section are not surprising 
when one considers their political context. Suburbanites, who 
include less than 10 percent minorities,59 cast the majority of 
votes in local and national elections, so predominantly minority 
inner-city residents elect fewer state and national legislators 
to represent their interests. It is not that minorities do not 
care, or do not vote. It is a function of our electoral process. 
The increasingly homogeneous two-party system, geographically 
defined districting, and gerrymandering, are only a few ways 
minority voters are discouraged from participating in the 
political process and excluded from democracy. Although they 
begin as strong participants in the electoral system, minorities 
soon learn that their vote does not carry the same weight as a 
white vote in “winner-take-all majority rule.”60 Because of 
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these and other injustices, Lani Guinier, in her book, The 
Tyranny of the Majority,61 argues forcefully for a change to 
cumulative voting, which is not biased like the present system 
is:  
It [cumulative voting] gives each voter the same number of 
votes as there are seats or options to vote for, and they 
can distribute their votes in any combination to reflect 
their preferences...it allows voters to organize themselves 
on whatever basis they wish.62  
In this way, everyone’s preferences would be counted equally. 
Voting would focus on political interests rather than 
geographical location and it would become far more difficult to 
maintain the gross inequities of race-conscious districting.   
 In contrast to the 90 percent white suburban schools, over 
three-quarters of students in inner-city schools are African 
American or Latino.63 Yet, although the need for resources is 
greater than in the more affluent suburbs, urban school budgets 
across the nation are one-tenth those of suburban schools.64 
School buildings are literally falling apart and supplies are 
few.65 This is not a recent development. James B. Conant, in his 
1961 book, Slums and Suburbs: A Commentary on Schools in 
Metropolitan Areas, raised similar issues.66 Thirty years later, 
Jonathan Kozol’s best-selling book, Savage Inequalities, brought 
national attention to even more severe economic and educational 
disparities.67 Not coincidentally, urban schools continue to 
deteriorate as the minority population increases. 
 Recent research confirms that instruction in inner-city 
schools is frequently substandard.68 In New York City alone, 66 
percent of all students who attend high school fail to graduate. 
For Latino students the rate is 80 percent, for African 
Americans, 72 percent, for whites, 50 percent. Statistics from 
other cities are equally grim.69 Teachers, “low standards,” 
and/or lack of discipline are not to blame. (See the last 
chapter of this volume, for a discussion of those issues). 
Social class is the greatest predictor of who drops out—or gets 
"pushed out" of school. The failure of schools and society to 
recognize that this behavior is not just reactive but proactive 
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guarantees that these problems will continue. As Willis’s70 
classic study with British youth showed, delinquency is not a 
mechanical response to social disadvantage but active resistance 
to the dominant tradition by the production of alternative or 
oppositional practices. This resistance is rooted in the social 
relationships of the students’ communities and is not 
necessarily reducible to capitalist pressures and processes.71 
Dropping out is not merely the result of alienation but is an 
assertive rejection of the system and what it represents.72  
 One reason rejection of the system takes forms of responses 
like not voting and dropping out of school instead of a more 
openly aggressive stand (possibly even taking steps toward a 
popular revolution), is because mechanisms of the class system 
have “always been buffered by an even more discriminatory caste 
system (of whites vs. blacks).”73 Although there are more than 
three times as many non-African American, largely white poor 
than there are African American poor, poverty is generally not 
considered quite as damaging and demoralizing to poor whites 
because “blacks have always been there to occupy a position 
lower in the social scale than even the poorest whites.”74 There 
is 
a vested interest on the part of both rich and poor whites 
to maintain the caste system of discrimination against 
blacks, For the rich, it has been a cheap way (both 
financially and morally) to continue to possess and control 
a disproportionate share of the national wealth and income. 
And poor American whites have let themselves be distracted 
from paying attention to how badly they are being 
discriminated against by the class system, by the fact that 
there is always a group they can look down upon...that in 
turn buys peace for the rich, who can continue to 
monopolize most of the nation’s wealth and income without 
having to be bothered by any significant threats to their 
privileges.” 75  
Racism is the “weapon of choice” used by the ruling class to 
keep the working class divided.76 The unity of the working class 
across color lines is “feared more than almost 
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anything else by Corporate America which uses every form of 
coercion, manipulation, and violence” to keep the working class 
from joining forces to fight their common enemy.77 Even Malcolm 
X, after a pilgrimage to Mecca near the end of his life, 
realized that “it isn’t the American white man who is a racist, 
but it’s the American political, economic, and social atmosphere 
that automatically nourishes a racist psychology in the white 
man.”78 It has been argued by many that racism is so deeply 
internalized that [most] whites are not even aware of its 
existence or how far they will go to keep it that way.79 As 
Spina and Tai explain: 
Not seeing race is predicated on not seeing White as a 
race....Ignoring the racial construction of Whiteness 
reinscribes its centrality and reinforces its privileged 
and oppressive position as normative. Thus, Whiteness 
becomes a non-race, invisible to those that would seek to 
analyze race and racism, thereby giving it more power, more 
privilege, and more impunity. The non-racialization of 
Whiteness restricts the ability of minorities to point out 
racism and gives the dominant White culture more freedom 
from criticism in the practice of racism.80  
Racism is so normalized in this country that in surveys,81 
newspapers, and on national television,82 white Americans, and 
some (more affluent) black Americans, repeatedly express the 
belief that racism is no longer a problem in the United States. 
Why is this view, so at odds with reality, gaining support?   
 Perhaps one contributing factor is what Americans are not 
allowed to know.83 The U.S. government has selectively repressed 
data which would reveal the blatantly racist “nature, location, 
and dimensions of violence in this country.”84 Since 1960, for 
example, when the U.S. Public Health Service began to calculate 
age-adjusted death rates separately for blacks and whites, the 
death rate for blacks has been consistently about 280 more 
deaths per 100,000 than whites.85 In comparison, the national 
homicide rate is about 10 per 100,000.86 Yet, the latter is 
positioned as a “national emergency, over which presidential 
elections are won and lost,”87 and the former remains buried in 
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relatively obscure government publications. If this is not 
“proof” enough, 
Any doubt that the excess death rate among blacks is a 
function of the social and economic structure of our 
society is put to rest by epidemiological studies. Several 
investigations88 have shown that high blood pressure, for 
example, is common among American, West Indian, South 
African, and other urbanized African blacks, but infrequent 
among rural Africans (that is, those least exposed to the 
social and economic structure of colonialism and white 
domination).89  
 Furthermore, some suggest that contemporary conservative 
politicians are systematically encouraging whites to blame 
immigrants and poor ethnic minorities for economic 
difficulties.90 As Kristeva explains, such exclusionist 
discourse, where violence is turned against the “foreigner,” the 
“refugee,” the “immigrant,” the “other,” normalizes a system 
based on one group against all external others; i.e., a 
pervasive and violent form of racism.91 Using rhetoric that 
blames affirmative action for the loss of “white” jobs and 
fosters a belief that “the deterioration of society is the fault 
of immigrants and people of color,” conservatives both divert 
attention from the increasing inequality reflected in the 
widening gap between the upper socioeconomic groups and the rest 
of the populace and simultaneously divided traditional 
coalitions of labor, ethnic minorities, and women.”92 President 
Clinton has publicly blamed the victims of poverty and racism 
for their situation, saying that if they would “pull themselves 
up by the bootstraps” and “put an end to crime in their own 
communities,” things would get better.93 With much patriotic 
flourish, an ethos of callousness is legitimized under the 
rubric of competition, survival of the fittest, and the 
“American” way.   
 
Despite invoking ideals of democracy, traditional “American” 
values are selectively and strategically applied by those in 
power, especially when defining criminality.94 James Gilligan 
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offers one of the most telling examples of this bias: 
It is remarkable to me how seldom people recognize the 
extent to which many of the criminals today are 
contemporary versions of our own ancestors. For example...I 
vary between being amused and bemused by the moral 
indignation with which some politicians who happen to be 
Boston Brahmins denounce the scandalous behavior of young 
male drug dealers. These young men are, of course, classic 
examples of capitalist entrepreneurs, whom one would think 
would be extolled by these Bostonians as role models for 
their peers. They are, after all, making fortunes by their 
business activities, with tremendous returns on relatively 
small investments, and they often manage to save and invest 
their considerable earnings as conscientiously as did the 
Brahmins’ own ancestors. The fact is that the ancestors of 
the latter group made the fortunes on which their 
descendants are now living (comfortably enough that they do 
not need to deal drugs) by means of the seventeenth- and 
eighteenth-century equivalents of drug-dealing such as 
slave-trafficking, opium-smuggling, rum-running, and 
killing.95  
Gilligan is careful to point out that this is not meant to 
trivialize the devastation of illicit drug abuse but to put the 
construction of criminality in perspective. A Washington, D.C., 
high school student, reacting to the simplistic “Just Say No to 
Drugs” campaign, gives us an even harder dose of reality: “I 
make a hundred bucks an hour selling drugs. What does the 
President want me to do, work at McDonald’s for the minimum 
wage?”96  
 Similarly, present-day upper-class economic crimes such as 
embezzlement, price fixing, fraud, professional and business 
malpractice, and corruption (not to mention the legalized crime 
of tax benefits for the wealthy at the expense of the vast 
majority of Americans), far outweigh the economic costs of 
lower-class crimes. Yet, white-collar criminals constitute only 
a small fraction of the prison population. Penal sanctions are 
primarily applied against crimes of need, not crimes of greed. 
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This situation is sarcastically summarized by Anatole France: 
“The law, in its majestic equality, forbids the rich as well as 
the poor to sleep under bridges, to beg in the streets, and to 
steal bread.”97  
Street Gangs  
Another way the American aristocracy feeds off the marginalized 
is manifested in the paradoxes of gang culture.98 Although gangs 
each have distinctive identities, they tend to be treated as a 
homogeneous "problem" in ways reminiscent of the stereotyping of 
certain racial and ethnic groups.  
 What images come to mind when you think of a gang? The 
typical picture is a group of dark-skinned male minority youths, 
dressed in similar clothing, swaggering together down school 
corridors or neighborhood streets and perceived as threatening 
to “outsiders.” AS Cummings and Monti point out: 
We would have more difficulty conceiving of gangs as young 
men strutting through high school corridors while dressed 
out in identical team jackets or a set of college students 
being formally initiated with secret rituals into a group 
dedicated to a “brotherhood,” carousing, and intermittent 
outbursts of vandalism. Fraternities and football teams are 
not “gangs” in the commonly accepted sense of that term; 
but they do exhibit certain traits that frequently are 
associated with gangs.99  
The difference is that crimes condemning gangs are considered 
merely “boys will be boys” antics when committed by higher-class 
“gangs” sporting Greek letters or football team mascots as their 
colors. This is not meant to excuse gang violence (of any type) 
or to argue that we should dismiss violent behavior as a ritual 
of male bonding (which we most definitely should not),100 but to 
underscore the variations in our attributions of culpability 
both across and within these groups. 
 Similarly, the intolerance of personal disrespect that is 
part of the “street code” has been highly publicized and widely 
condemned. Yet the gentlemen’s “code of honor” that dominated 
the mannered culture of the antebellum South was considered a 
respectable way to respond to insults.  When John Dickinson, a 
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Nashville lawyer, made offensive comments about Andrew Jackson’s 
wife, Jackson, the future president, shot and killed the man 
(who also happened to be his political opponent). And every 
student of American history learns about the famous duel between 
Alexander Hamilton and Aaron Burr. When practiced by those at 
the top of the Southern caste system, revenge in the form of 
ritualized and cold-blooded killing has always been an accepted 
way to solve problems.  
 It is important to realize, despite media-manipulated 
perceptions, even among the most “violent” street gangs, violent 
behavior is relatively rare.101 The gangs Padilla works with, 
for example, “participate in a violent world,” but “view what 
they’re doing as expressions of resistance, freedom, and 
election” and “as superior to the way of life and occupational 
choices of their ‘conformist peers’ or ‘straight youth.’”102 
Gang leaders share profits with other gang members and all see 
their economic welfare as tied to the gang.103 Sullivan’s 
research also highlights gang members’ awareness and positioning 
of crime vis-à-vis the exigencies of a market economy. He writes 
that the young men in these studies104 ironically 
spoke of their criminal activities as “getting over” and  
“getting paid,” terms that refer directly...to economic 
motivation and reflect the perception of a social structure 
of restricted opportunity. “Getting paid” equates crime 
with work. “Getting over” means beating the system, a 
rigged system in which one is unlikely to succeed by 
competing according to the rules.105  
 Besides being blamed for increased crime, gangs also take 
the rap for crimes of commodification that play both sides 
against them. For example, on one hand, antigraffiti campaigns 
criminalize those who use the walls of the projects to 
communicate106 while, on the other hand, downtown gallery owners 
get rich from the work of those few graffiti artists they 
charitably “rescue” to paint in lofts instead of gutters, 
providing trendy decor for their upscale patrons to signal their 
financial status and cultural savvy. The co-optation of street 
gang symbols by fashion, music, and media also add a capitalist 
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cachet to gang symbols and legends while separating them from 
contextual economic and social conditions. They become either 
superficial, disposable possessions of wealthier youth who can 
afford them or an attempt to gain, by association, some of the 
adult recognition and fear, if not respect, of one of the few 
groups in their age cohort that has managed to do that. The use 
of gang symbols by upper classes can trivialize gang culture and 
further marginalize gangs.107 But it can also speak to the 
tenuous position of all young people in the social order.  
Gendered Violence 
High levels of violence are not confined to urban schools with 
predominantly African American and Latino/a populations. 
Violence is also increasing in suburban and rural schools, 
especially among white male students. Although not necessarily 
economically disadvantaged, white male students can be 
marginalized in other ways. Those who do not conform to accepted 
roles and expectations are often alienated from the dominant 
culture and at the bottom of the social hierarchy of schools 
(nerds, geeks, fags, etc.). These “minority” students are 
indoctrinated with almost the same message as inner-city 
students: pretty girls, strong boys, thin, rich, smart kids are 
the ones who matter.108 Add “white” to the list and it’s the 
urban version.  
 Shooting sprees by middle-class white teenage males in 
small towns and suburbs in twenty-five states captured national 
and international headlines during the 1997–98 and 1998–99 school 
years.109 In contrast, killers and victims of color and/or from 
the inner cities garner no such media interest. No specially 
trained counselors are sent to help the predominantly African 
American and Latino/a students in inner-city schools cope with 
their trauma. No emergency crews arrive with spackle and paint 
to remove bullet holes and other signs of violence from city 
schools. In fact, after the 1999 shooting at Colorado's 98 
percent white Columbine High School, newspapers featured short 
biographies about each of the twelve white students who had been 
murdered. The one African American student who had been killed 
was not eulogized. Instead, the papers printed a much shorter 
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story about how angry his father was. Although all parents of 
these victims must have been understandably angry, only the 
black male parent’s rage was displayed in the press, while his 
dead son was not memorialized like the white victims were.110 
This exploitive construction of their identities (or erasing of 
identity, in the case of the son) as (negatively) different from 
or “other” than those of the white victims and their families 
was not accidental, although it may not have been conscious. It 
was representative of the more pervasive, insidious discourses 
of structural racism and implies that the dominant white culture 
and experience is the norm.  
 Although racism dominates the American subconscious, sexual 
harassment and improprieties dominate the American 
consciousness. Try, as O’Toole and Schiffman urge us, to “think 
about the most consuming events of the last decade, those that 
grabbed the attention of the public through news headlines and 
court television and dominated daily conversation.”111 Think 
about the O. J. Simpson trial;112 “ethnic cleansing” and other 
atrocities committed by the Serbs against Albanians in 
Bosnia;113 the rape of a twelve-year-old Okinawa schoolgirl by 
three U.S. servicemen. All of these acts of violence share a 
common link: They were perpetrated by males, acting individually 
or in groups, “for whom violence and violation are rational 
solutions to perceived problems ranging from the need to inflate 
one’s sexual self-esteem to denigrating rivals in war to 
boosting a country’s GNP.”114 Our culture rewards men for 
practicing violence “in virtually any sphere of activity by 
money, admiration, recognition, respect, and the genuflection of 
others honoring their sacred and proven masculinity. In male 
culture, police are heroic and so are outlaws; males who enforce 
standards are heroic and so are those who violate them.”115  
 Brutal acts by American sports heroes and foreign armies 
dominate the landscape of gendered violence in the media, but 
they represent only the smallest fraction of violent acts 
against women and of the dangers women face on a daily basis.116 
Even the language used to describe violence against women 
contributes to its perpetuity. The term “battered woman,” for 
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example, is deceptive because the harm done to her becomes an 
adjective, which implies it is an attribute of the woman and not 
something someone did to her.117 This is particularly 
distressing because battering is the leading cause of injury to 
women in the United States. Similarly, using the term “domestic” 
violence to denote family violence minimizes its cruelty and 
masks the gender bias of what used to be known as “wife 
beating,” or, in the words of Frances Power Cobbe, an Irish 
reformer and feminist of the late 1800s, “wife torture.”118 
Cobbe’s words, as Ann Jones notes, remind us of scenes from 
Charles Dickens and Thomas Hardy; from D. H. Lawrence, 
Dostoevsky, and Émile Zola; from Doris Lessing, Toni Morrison, 
Alice Munro, and Alice Walker; Wife torture  
conjure(s) the scenes between beatings: the sullen husband, 
withdrawn and sulking, or angry and intimidating, dumping 
dinner on the floor, throwing the cat against the wall, 
screaming, twisting a child’s arm, needling, nagging, 
manipulating, criticizing the bitch, the cunt who never 
does anything right, who’s ugly and stupid, who should keep 
her mouth shut, who should spread her legs now, who should 
be dead, who will be if she’s not careful.119  
“Domestic violence,” it may be argued, is a more comprehensive 
term that is not only neutral in terms of gender but also sexual 
preference. That assumes violence in homosexual couples is the 
same thing as in heterosexual relationships. It is not. Our 
culture clearly supports, if not encourages, wife beating. This 
gives it a legitimacy that differentiates it from abuse within 
gay and lesbian relationships. On the other hand, the 
marginalization of homosexuals trivializes violence in their 
communities and ignores its victims, despite the fact that an 
estimated 25 percent of all gay men and women in intimate 
relationships are victims of “domestic” abuse. Using gender-
neutral terminology, despite the real problem of “domestic” 
violence committed by women against women, women against men, 
and men against men, the assailant in almost all cases of 
violence, heterosexual and homosexual, is a man.120  
 The term “domestic violence” ostensibly includes children, 
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but they are often its forgotten victims. Aside from the 
increased danger of children being physically abused in violent 
homes, they are almost always psychologically and emotionally 
abused. A reported minimum of 3.3 million children a year 
witness violent parental abuse ranging from hitting or slapping 
to murder. (Because family violence is underreported, the actual 
figure is much higher.)121 The problem is compounded because the 
combination of inadequate job opportunities and lack of outside 
financial and child care support trap women (and their children) 
in abusive relationships. Sexual harassment, battering, rape, 
murder, sexual abuse of women and children, and other forms of 
gender violence are not random events or practices perpetrated 
by “other” political regimes and a few celebrities. They are 
intrinsic components of America’s heritage and culture. 
The Role of Religion 
Although separation of church and state is a fundamental 
cornerstone of U.S. government, religion has always been in 
collusion with politics and vice versa. Martín-Baró,122 makes a 
useful and appropriate distinction between vertical religiosity, 
which leads to alienation and oppression, and horizontal 
religiosity, which leads to empowering critical consciousness 
and social liberation. Both can exist individually or in 
combination with other religious practices, but the direction 
taken reflects its ideological dimension.  
 Martín-Baró, a Jesuit priest and critical psychologist, 
conducted a series of studies in El Salvador which confirmed 
that there was a clear connection between religious beliefs and 
sociopolitical choices. His analysis found that even though 
religion has individual meaning, the ideological milieu provides 
the context for how one interprets one’s beliefs. The dominant 
western European Christian tradition is one of vertical 
religiosity and that, not horizontal religiosity,123 is the 
“religion” discussed below. 
 Historically, when the shift from goddess worship to 
patriarchal religions replaced the reciprocal relationship of 
nature and humanity with the superiority of man over nature (and 
women), the cultural sanction of violence as an expression of 
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power and control became the norm.124 Sexism, classism, and 
racism are replete in religious texts such as the Torah, Qur’an, 
and New Testament. The use of violence was both official and 
individual. In the seventh century B.C.E., Josiah ordered the 
annihilation of every non-Hebrew Canaanite in order to eradicate 
lingering remnants of goddess worship. At “God’s command,” 
Joshua led the Hebrews to conquer Palestine by killing every 
man, woman and child they encountered.125 Catholic “holy” wars 
or crusades sanctioned murder, rape, and other atrocities in the 
name of God and church coffers. The 14th-century Roman Catholic 
Church authorized the notorious torture of the Inquisition as 
warnings to others who might question the authority of the 
Church and thereby weaken her political power.  
 It was also seen as a duty to colonize and Christianize the 
“savages” of the world. Ships were sent to the colonies with 
armies and missionaries and returned laden with slaves and 
treasures wrested from the conquered. Churches and governments 
grew rich on the backs of colonialized people by destroying 
their cultures, their economy, their spirits, their lives. 
Although conquered peoples were often seen as less-than-human, 
religions also fostered the belief that humans are inherently 
bad—and women even worse. In officially sanctioned versions of 
Biblical texts, Eve, after all, is responsible for tempting Adam 
to eat the forbidden fruit and thus for their (and our) 
expulsion from the Garden of Eden. The stigma of Eve’s sin has 
marked all women as less-than-man. From Augustine to Aquinas 
(and Aristotle before them), the female is marked as too 
emotional and impulsive and thus not “rational” enough, fickle, 
weak, deceitful, and generally morally and intellectually 
inferior to men.126  
 Catholicism was the first Christian religion but by no 
means was it the most oppressive or influential.127 The 
fundamental Calvinist tenet of predestination is perhaps the 
strongest contender for that title. Predestination refers to the 
belief that people are divided into two groups—the redeemed and 
the damned—before they are born and there is no way to change 
one’s fate. Because success is considered a sign of God’s 
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grace, people work hard to achieve so they (and others) can be 
convinced they are among the saved.128 Those at the top of the 
hierarchy can then tautologically justify their position and 
behavior by invoking this tenet. In addition to stressing the 
evil of idleness and human nature, the Calvinist tradition also 
opposed enjoyment and personal luxuries.  
 The late 17th-century Salem, Massachusetts, witch trials 
were but one embodiment of this dogmatic and misogynous 
heritage. As Weber has shown, the Calvinist form of radical 
individualism that questioned the religious value of poverty and 
forbearance became the foundation of capitalism and an 
oppressive, militant, self-righteous morality. Today, it is 
evident in efforts limiting reproductive rights, in bemoaning 
the break-up of the (presumably functional) nuclear family while 
forcing even single mothers to abandon their children so they 
can work, paying men higher salaries than women who do the same 
work, sanctioning injustices in our law enforcement system, and 
opposing social justice. In short, it is the agenda of the 
conservative government and the “religious” right. It is the 
hegemonic ideology.  
 The heritage of vertical religiosity is not oppressive only 
to women and children. It harms men in ways that are sometimes 
even more insidious and dangerous. Since male behavior is the 
norm, violence and war are not only accepted as normal, but they 
are elevated as noble, heroic events. This only makes it more 
difficult to see how qualities that define “manhood,” like 
emotional detachment, competitiveness, and toughness, can be 
detrimental.129 All that matters is winning—whether it means a 
hostile corporate takeover that puts thousands out of work, 
dropping an atomic bomb on innocent men, women, and children, or 
shooting an “enemy” with a handgun.  
Guns and Poses 
Firearms have figured prominently in U.S. history, and their 
continuing presence is often attributed to the country’s strong 
cultural sense of its frontier heritage. As Gellert points out, 
other countries have a similar frontier tradition (e.g., Canada 
and Australia) but have only a fraction of America’s rates of 
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gun ownership or gun-related homicide and violence. For example, 
the homicide rate among males aged fifteen to twenty-four in the 
United States is ten times higher than in Canada, and fifteen 
times higher than Australia.130 Australia has one-seventh the 
proportionate private handgun ownership of the United States. 
Friedman and Fisher attribute this, not to a “frontier” legacy 
but, more accurately, to the varying historic dominance of 
market culture and institutions between countries such as the 
United States and Canada. They argue that it is not a 
coincidence that Canada has both more stringent controls over 
the sale of guns and a much more generous “welfare state” than 
the United States, or that Canada pioneered the kind of 
universal medical care system the United States has fiercely and 
effectively resisted in the name of a “free market.”131  
 The United States has the highest rate of nonwar gun-
related homicide in the world. The United States is also the 
only industrialized nation that does not effectively regulate 
private ownership of firearms,132 even though there are 
currently more than 20,000 laws in the United States that deal 
with the sale, distribution, and use of firearms. Almost one-
half of all American households have one or more firearms. 
Although accurate figures are not available, the American 
Medical Association estimates that there are approximately 210 
million firearms in the United States, 60 million of which are 
handguns.133  
 The rhetoric that argues “if guns are criminalized only 
criminals will have guns” and law-abiding citizens will have no 
means to protect themselves is not supported by data. The 
majority of U.S. homicides are not committed by those with any 
criminal record. Most homicides are the result of a complex 
interaction of emotional and societal forces and are not 
associated with other felonies or a previous history of crime. 
Guns intended to protect against crime are forty-three times 
more likely to kill a family member, friend, or acquaintance 
than to kill an intruder in self-defense.134 The risk of 
domestic homicide in families owning a gun doubles.135 Adults 
whose parents owned a gun are twice as likely to own one 
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themselves.136 Data also contradict the racist-based fear 
exploited by George Bush in his now infamous “Willie Horton” 
campaign commercial. The commercial used a mug shot of an 
African American with a voice-over that told how he had been 
furloughed in Massachusetts and subsequently beat and terrorized 
a man and raped his wife in another state. The commercial played 
on the common but mistaken belief that violent crime is 
disproportionately committed by blacks against white victims. 
Although whites are more likely to own guns than blacks, blacks 
are three times as likely as whites to be victims of a violent 
crime committed with a handgun. More than 90 percent of the 
victims of black violence are other blacks.137  
 The “Constitutional right” argument is similarly divorced 
from fact. Even though the second amendment says “the right of 
the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed,” all 
U.S. Supreme Court decisions have held that this does not 
protect an individual’s right to private gun ownership, despite 
the belief to the contrary of 60 percent of Americans.138 What 
about the right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness 
(emphasis added)? The fact is guns are a highly profitable, 
major American industry in a culture where money matters most. 
The National Rifle Association (NRA) is a powerful, well-funded 
contributor to select political campaigns and advocate of the 
gun industry. The problem—and most important discrepancy in the 
data—is that when it comes to firearms, profits are measured in 
dollars and costs are measured in lives.  
Police Beat 
Since July 1991 New York and other U.S. cities have been touting 
a downward trend in both violent and property crime.  According 
to the FBI, national murder and robbery statistics for 1997 show 
a decline of 7 percent. However, as evidenced by a Morning 
Edition report on National Public Radio (NPR) on November 23, 
1998, there is growing concern among the public, as well as 
among criminologists, that the figures merely indicate increased 
political pressure on police to keep crime rates low.  On that 
program, Eric Westervelt reported that the New Orleans Office of 
Municipal Investigation found that dozens of crimes in 
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the city were altered or downgraded so that tourists would not 
be scared away. Westervelt tells of one woman who was stabbed 
twelve times while resisting rape by an intruder who attacked 
her in her own bed. According to FBI guidelines, the crime 
should have been reported as attempted rape and aggravated 
assault and battery—a major crime. But New Orleans police 
classified the attack simply as an aggravated burglary, avoiding 
mention of anything that might appear on the violent crime 
reports. In another attack, Westervelt reported, “a man ended up 
in the emergency room with stab wounds to his back during a 
robbery. That, too, was written up as an aggravated burglary.” 
This “creative crime counting” is not restricted to New Orleans 
or other favorite tourist destinations. Police commanders in New 
York, Boca Raton, Philadelphia, Atlanta, and several other 
cities were criticized, demoted, or transferred in 1998 for 
similar offenses.   
 Westervelt also interviewed Jim Fife, a criminologist and 
former New York City police officer, who said that crime 
statistics were the “worst official statistics in the U.S.” and 
that current practices were not without precedent. Pressure to 
manipulate statistics comes not only from cities looking to 
boost their images, but also because promotions and pay raises 
are largely based on crime statistics. According to Fife, 
downgrading was common practice when he joined the force in the 
early 1960s, and continues to this day. Westervelt reported 
that, in 1996 and 1997, the FBI “tossed out” the Philadelphia 
crime reports “because they were totally unreliable.” Although 
John Timmony, the Philadelphia police commissioner, called the 
majority of mistakes “stupid, careless, [or] lazy” unintentional 
miscodings, an investigation by the Philadelphia Inquirer found 
that statement contradicted by repeated examples of recent 
downgrading.   
 The problem is exacerbated, especially in inner cities, 
when citizens fail to report crimes. As Fife explained: 
The suburbanite whose car is broken into is alarmed because 
this is the first time this has happened and he's paying 
enormous taxes and he expects the police to come out with a 
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fingerprint kit and solve the problem.  The guy in the 
inner city to whom that happens knows it ain't gonna 
happen, so he doesn't bother reporting it.  So almost 
certainly crime in the worst parts of the United States is 
very much underreported by citizens.   
Not responding to alarms in “certain” neighborhoods represents 
more than dereliction of duty or a shortage of police officers. 
It is just one way the racial bias that pervades police 
departments across the country manifests itself. Other ways can 
be, unfortunately, far more serious.139 Although all police 
officers are not racist, many police departments across the 
country tolerate prejudice in their ranks. Racism is the most 
blatantly displayed.  
 On Thursday, February 4, 1999, Amadou “Ahmed” Diallo, an 
unarmed twenty-two-year old West African man with no criminal 
record, was shot to death at 12:45 a.m. in the vestibule to his 
apartment. He was killed by four (white) officers assigned to an 
elite plainclothes unit trying to solve a series of rapes and 
robberies in the Bronx and Manhattan. Diallo was shot forty-one 
times. (The four members of the New York Police Department’s 
Street Crime Unit were subsequently indicted on second-degree 
murder charges and acquitted.) 
 The institutionalized racism and brutality of the NYPD had 
reached international proportions. Thousands in Guinea, 
including top government officials, attended Diallo’s funeral. 
The Diallo shooting became the catalyst for a national and 
international debate on U.S. police practices and the racial 
conflict between urban officers and the communities they patrol. 
The president of the United African Congress, Sidique Abubakarr 
Wai, charged New York City officials with flagrant disregard for 
African lives and condemned their failure to aggressively seek 
the murderers of "several dozen Senegalese cabdrivers who have 
been killed over the past decade or so."140 Outraged citizens of 
all ages, colors, and incomes gathered daily in New York, in 
groups ranging in size from a handful to more than 10,000, to 
protest police racism and brutality. Demonstrations were also 
held in Washington, D.C., and other major cities. On Tuesday, 
 
27 
March 28, 1999, hundreds of police officers, nearly all of them 
white, marched in the Bronx in support of the four officers who 
shot Amadou Diallo, contending that the killing of Mr. Diallo 
was a tragedy but not a crime. 
 On February 25, 2000, a jury cleared the four police 
officers of murder, manslaughter, and lesser criminal charges in 
the slaying of Amadou Diallo. Public protests followed in 
Albany, the Bronx, and elsewhere. Amadou's father, Saikou Diallo 
called the change in trial venue from the Bronx to the state 
capitol "the second murder" of his son. As this book goes to 
press, the NAACP is demanding a federal investigation of the 
case and the Diallo family is planning a civil lawsuit against 
the city and the officers.141 
 
 The police do not deny that minorities are targeted as 
suspects. A manual used by the Public Agency Training Council in 
Indianapolis even suggests stopping all cars with  "Jamaican 
paraphernalia, bumper stickers or slogans."142 The police argue 
that they stop more blacks because there are more blacks in jail 
because blacks commit more crimes. But they fail to recognize 
the circularity of this reasoning. It doesn't occur to them that 
perhaps there are more blacks in jail because they are so 
targeted. They have no way of knowing how many more whites would 
be in jail today if they were also stopped or if criteria other 
than race were used. 
 The “profiling” controversy and the use of race and 
ethnicity as clues to criminality prompted state and federal 
investigations into police behavior across the country.  
However, three years earlier, in 1996, Amnesty International 
issued a report on “Police Brutality and Excessive Force in the 
New York City Police Department.”143 The human rights advocates 
documented the disproportionate number of people of color who 
were physically abused and sometimes killed, often by shots in 
the back, in situations that “did not warrant the use of lethal 
force” and were “in violation of police guidelines and 
international standards.”144  
 Also in 1996, a New Jersey judge found state troopers 
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engaged in the illegal practice of tageting of minority drivers, 
creating a "stark" disparity in which blacks were almost five 
times more likely to be stopped than whites. After years of 
denial, in April, 1999 (shortly after the Diallo murder and the 
massive national public demonstrations against police bias and 
brutality that followed), New Jersey's Governor Christine Todd 
Whitman, most likely with an eye on the polls, finally 
acknowledged that state troopers have disproportionately and 
improperly stopped and searched black drivers on the New Jersey 
Turnpike in attempts to catch drug dealers and other criminals. 
More than 77 percent of all drivers so targeted were members of 
a minority group.145 This blatant racism is not unique to the 
New York area. Comparable statistics have been found in other 
states. In Maryland, for example, the state police agreed as 
part of a court settlement to track the race of drivers that 
troopers stopped and searched on a stretch of I-95. Only 17 
percent of the drivers on that road were black, but more than 70 
percent of those searched in the first 20 months were African 
American. The “war against crime and drugs” is clearly a race 
war.146 
 The police, it should be noted, are in a difficult if not 
impossible position. Their job is to prevent crime, yet the 
conditions that are responsible for high crime rates are not 
part of the equation. At the core of our law enforcement system 
is a belief that people (and especially people of color) are 
innately violent and need external social controls to contain 
them. By some convoluted form of logic, this legitimizes the use 
of violence to “control” violence. The job of police, by 
definition, is to maintain order and control, typically through 
coercion. The model is one of professionalized “crime fighting,” 
reflecting its military roots in history and imagery and 
contributing to a “bunker mentality” that feeds suspicions of 
“outsiders” and fosters secrecy that minimizes 
accountability.147 It applies military concepts (criminals as 
enemies) and terminology (war on drugs) as well as solutions 
(punishment) to social, political, and economic problems. It is 
violence used to protect even greater violence. It is violence 
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for social control, not social good. It is violence that 
perpetuates a caste system reminiscent of discriminatory law 
interpretation, application, and enforcement in which blacks 
received decidedly harsher punishments, especially for crimes 
against whites.148  
Behind Bars 
The United States has a larger percentage of its population 
incarcerated than any other country. Between 1980 and 1994, the 
number of inmates in state and federal prisons and local jails 
increased three-fold, from 329,821 to more than 1.8 million,149 
including over 95,000 youths.150 The overall American rate of 
imprisonment is now ten times as high as that of Japan. 
California has the largest prison system, larger than any single 
country in the Western industrialized world, and larger than 
that of France, Germany, Great Britain, Japan, Singapore, and 
the Netherlands combined.151 For the past twenty years, 
California has imprisoned 450 out of every 100,000 juveniles—a 
higher percentage of its youth than any other state. Although 
whites are the largest racial group in the state, black and 
Latino youth are eight times as likely to be arrested as a white 
California teen. In Utah, where less than 1 percent of the 
state’s residents are black, eight times more black youths are 
also held in detention. Half of the inmates in all American 
prisons are African American, yet blacks make up only about 10 
percent of the total American population. One out of three young 
African American (ages eighteen to thirty-five) men in the 
United States are in prison or on parole. The percentage of 
black men in prison in this country is four times higher than in 
South Africa at the height of apartheid.152 Of the 80,000 women 
now imprisoned, about 70 percent are nonviolent offenders and 75 
percent have children. (Although women make up only a little 
more than 7 percent of all U.S. inmates, they are the fastest-
growing segment of the prison population.)153 More than one out 
of nine school-age children has one or both parents in prison. 
If present policies continue, this number will soon reach one 
out of four.154 The National Center for Juvenile Justice reports 
that the number of youth age ten through seventeen who are 
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arrested and incarcerated for violent crimes could more than 
double by the year 2010 if current rates continue.  
 The exponentially growing prison population is largely due 
to four interrelated factors: (1) special interests, (2) the 
misguided “war on drugs,” (3) the equally mistaken belief that 
“getting tough on crime” will suppress it, and (4) the market 
economy.  
 Firstly, despite the high cost of maintenance (about 
$40,000 per inmate per year)155 prison compounds have blurred 
the line between public and private interests. Politicians use 
them to scare up votes based on fear of crime. Impoverished 
rural areas reap financial benefits from the jobs created.156 
Private (and not so private) companies exploit the $35 billion 
prison budget for substantial profits. UNICOR (the acronym-like 
name used by Federal Prison Industries), for example, is a 
government corporation/ manufacturing conglomerate created in 
1934 by the U.S. Department of Justice with the Federal Bureau 
of Prisons. In federal fiscal year 1996, UNICOR employed 17,379 
inmates and had $495.4 million in sales, 61.6 percent of which 
went to the Department of Defense.157 Workers are paid from $.23 
to $1.15 per hour. A portion of these wages are applied to 
court-ordered fines, victim restitution, and other court-
assessed obligations. Not a single cent of UNICOR’s money goes 
for social security tax or any form of insurance. Nor does it 
help to defray the expenses of our vast prison system or the 
taxes we pay to support it.158 The U.S. prison system has become 
a major bureaucratic, political, and economic resource, subject 
to all of the surreptitious dealings and injustice that go along 
with it.  
 Secondly, the percentage of inmates serving time for 
nonviolent drug offenses has more than doubled since the early 
1980s, to 61 percent in the federal prison system and 30 percent 
in state systems. Some of these cases involve possession of only 
small amounts of marijuana or cocaine.159 Yet, the average 
sentence for a first-time, nonviolent drug offender is longer 
than the average sentence for rape, child molestation, bank 
robbery, or manslaughter. Our prisons are not overcrowded 
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because of necessity but because hegemonic self-interests find 
it profitable to keep them that way. To further contextualize 
the situation, it is also necessary to realize that, despite the 
$17 billion the United States is spending on the “war on drugs,” 
the damage done by illicit drugs does not come close to that 
caused by legal drugs like alcohol and tobacco. In 1989 alone, 
tobacco killed 395,000 Americans and cocaine killed 3,618. A 
recent issue of the New England Journal of Medicine (1998) 
reported that properly prescribed legal drugs kill 106,000 
Americans every year. That’s twenty times more than are killed 
by illegal drugs.160  
 Thirdly, increased criminalization is simply not working. 
For example, a meta-analysis of systematic assessments of 
“tough” delinquency programs and institutionalization found that 
these types of programs, such as “shock incarceration” and 
“scared straight,” produce higher, not lower, levels of 
recidivism.161 California now gives youthful offenders tougher 
sentences than adults convicted of the same crime. According to 
the California Department of Corrections, juveniles convicted of 
murder serve an average of five years in prison, compared to 
adult murderers who serve an average of three-and-a-half years. 
Yet youth homicide rates went from 350, which was below the 
national average in 1970, to 1400, or double the national 
average, by 1992.162 “Get tough” policies ignore the fact that 
the socialization of the prison system, where violence, 
extortion, and rape are routine, often promotes a career in 
crime and little else.163 
 Fourthly, the market economy requires a high percentage of 
persistent poverty, which has serious consequences for children, 
families, and society. As Friedman and Fisher explain: 
Because a basic operating principle of market society is to 
keep the public sector small, individuals and families are 
forced to rely on individual efforts to secure some of the 
basics of healthy human development that less Darwinian 
societies, even poorer ones, provide much more reliably and 
accessibly. Poor but relatively generous societies, 
accordingly, are likely to do a better job at keeping 
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violent crime low than wealthy but mean-spirited ones.164  
Persistent poverty and the lack of opportunities for lucrative 
employment play a crucial role in crime, which is often a 
proactive result of complex and rational choices.165 It is 
telling that Schwedinger and Schwedinger166 report that over 
half of all U.S. prison inmates, in the year before their 
arrest, earned no income at all, and one-third had an income of 
less than $2,000. Under- and unemployment, obstacles associated 
with racism (such as reducing federal aid to cities and poor 
families), and the deteriorating position of marginalized groups 
in the labor market have virtually eliminated the possibility of 
their obtaining funds in any legitimate way. All but the very 
top and lowest bottom rungs on the (albeit mythical) ladder of 
opportunity have been removed along with the social safety net. 
There is no way to climb out of poverty. 
Conclusion 
The previous pages have begun to illustrate some of the 
paradoxes and perversions of a system that condemns violence to 
garner votes, punishes victims in the name of justice, 
scapegoats schools to camouflage its own crimes, and promotes 
prejudice under the guise of fairness. However, the “problem” of 
violence, like its “solution,” runs even deeper than these. It 
courses through the veins of our body politic. It is inseparable 
from the roots of violence in American society—a cultural icon 
inextricably linked with history, entertainment, and economics. 
We admire the vigilante, glorify the gangster, idolize the 
gunslinger. Unless we come to grips with our past we cannot 
understand our present and envision the possibilities for 
reclaiming our future.  
 Our country was built on transgressive acts of violence 
that continue to this day.167 It is part of the “otherist,”168 
hegemonic American ideology to counter aggression with more 
aggression. The narratives of our violent past and present are 
turned into heroic epics, romanticizing danger and negating 
empathy, emotion, and pain. These myths create a deceptive 
fraternal nostalgia (sometimes called “patriotism”) that 
reinscribes socially sanctioned sentiments as 
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history. From the minute Columbus set foot on Caribbean soil and 
the extermination of native populations began, through the 
savagery of slavery and its aftermath, the frequently forceful 
resistance to the labor movement and civil rights, and the 
continuing violence against immigrants and other minorities such 
as homosexuals, the archaic and barbaric colonial and 
capitalistic mindset that drives U.S. domestic and foreign 
policies and practices has taken us down the path of disparity, 
denial, and devastation.   
 The combination of this legacy with(in) the positivist 
paradigm, has led to the development of “interventions” in the 
“war(s) against fill-in-the-blank” (e.g., violence, guns, 
drugs). Although these proposed solutions may be well 
intentioned, violence, when viewed through the “scientific” or 
logical positivist paradigm and the dominant ideology (the two 
are intertwined), focuses on its prediction and control, which 
is often a thinly disguised effort to homogenize youth so they 
conform to hegemonic ideals.  
 Positivism refers to a paradigm, or belief system, that 
claims objectivity, truth, and certainty exist in science and 
that scientific knowledge is irrefutable and universal. 
Positivists, contrary to more critical thinkers, do not consider 
science a social construction that reflects a particular 
ideology.169 Instead, positivism is deterministic, embracing 
control and prediction "[without taking] into account that human 
behavior is meaningful behavior that involves active agents with 
intentions and expectations and able to communicate with other 
equally active agents.”170 Positivism, by definition, rules out 
asking questions about domination and agency. Comte, who is 
often considered its founder, says the task of positivism is to 
maintain the status quo, to “imbue the people with the feeling 
that...no political change is of real importance.”171  
 This “scientized” position, or embrace of positivistic 
objectivity and determinism, continues to dominate U.S. rhetoric 
and policy on violence, as exemplified in the popularity of 
“tough” deterrents (i.e., punishment) which promise solutions 
they cannot and do not deliver. (Positivism and the 
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scientization of the social sciences is further discussed in 
chapter 8.) Furthermore, ignoring the ideological and social 
processes of violence by relying on an ethos of capitalist 
individualism and penal sanctions, in effect, punishes the true 
victims of violence by targeting populations labeled “high crime 
risks,” “dangerous,” and “subversive.” Not surprisingly, given 
this country’s racist propensities, the majority of these groups 
are young, poor, and people of color.  
 Alternatively, the authors of this volume maintain that 
onto-historical concerns are central to developing 
understandings of social phenomena. An onto-historical focus on 
violence situates it within the relationship between self and 
society, agency and control, power and structure. It 
demythologizes scientism and argues for understanding knowledge 
as embedded in the social, cultural, historical, and political 
milieu in which it is produced. It is grounded in theory, not 
ideology.  
 This position is not popular. It has been disparagingly 
called idealistic, unrealistic, and, with echoes of McCarthyism 
and all that implies, communistic. It has been discredited in 
public discourse and policy about violence by Wilson172 and 
others173 who argue that locating the causes of crime in 
conditions of social and economic disadvantage has limited value 
and offers almost no possibility of “practical applications“ for 
intervention. But their practical applications, many of which 
are discussed in the final chapter of this book, have proven 
useless. Despite decades of rhetoric and a variety of 
(superficial) interventions, violence and crime persist. They 
are using a coat of paint to repair a building with a faulty 
foundation. It is a cosmetic attempt, a diversion, an easy way 
out. Yet, these superficial “practical” solutions gain 
increasing support while approaches grounded in theoretical (as 
opposed to ideological) bases are dismissed as unimportant and 
criticized for being neither empirical nor practical when, to 
the contrary, theory is both empirical and practical, as well as 
necessary. Theory and practice are inextricably interwoven. 




 Given this relationship, it becomes apparent why, as 
Stanley and Wise observe, “Most of us have been brought up to 
think of theory as something arcane, mysterious, and rather 
forbidden.”174 We think of theory as beyond our reach, unless 
“we” happen to be one of the elite (i.e., “intelligent,” 
affluent, white, male). What we are not taught is that this way 
of thinking is a manifestation of ideology.175 Ideology, 
following Marx, refers to the beliefs of the dominant class that 
are used to “rationalize” its vested interests and maintain the 
status quo.176 Ideology has little, if any, systematic analysis 
of the actual socioeconomic, political, or cultural mechanisms 
prevalent in a society. It is a worldview that serves a 
normative function. 
 Theory, on the other hand, is thoroughly grounded in data. 
Without theory, data is incomprehensible. Theory explains the 
relationships among a set of concepts or phenomena in a 
meaningful way. It is defined as “explanation based on 
observation and reasoning” and as “principles.” It can inform a 
more democratic, humanistic, and successful future practice 
instead of perpetuating present practices (based on ideology, 
not theory) that simply do not work. 
 Denial of theory allows the dominant ideology to obscure 
its role in practice both methodologically and in the generation 
of knowledge. This makes it difficult to question the status quo 
which keeps a majority of Americans at an unjust disadvantage. 
In other words, the causes of violence in our society elude many 
of us because those at the top do not want us to see them. They 
prefer to play the "blame game," making it appear that others 
are at fault. Opportunistic politicians have jumped on the 
ba[n]dwagon of perfidious sentiment, convincing many that 
violence is caused by (1) deterioration of the nuclear family 
(while they repeatedly vote down measures for child care, etc., 
that would help families), (2) teenage pregnancy (when evidence 
shows that teenage pregnancy rates have declined steadily since 
the 1950s177 and that, in fact, the vast majority of fathers in 
“teen” pregnancies are older men, many of whom are guilty of 
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rape and transmitting AIDS),178 (3) welfare dependency (these 
politicians have led many Americans to believe that welfare is a 
major part of the United States budget when, in fact, basic 
welfare programs combined [Aid to Families with Dependent 
Children, Supplemental Security Income, and Food Stamps] amount 
to only 3.4 percent of the federal budget),179 and (4) moral 
decay (have they looked at the behavior of their own group 
lately?). It is not an accident that they divide and scapegoat 
vulnerable groups. These tactics assure that the tables of power 
are not turned by diverting attention from the sins of the 
powerful and laying them on the heads of groups whose access to 
recourse they prohibit. This book means to expose the 
ideological frameworks supporting these tables of power—not so 
they can be turned, but so they can be replaced with tables 
built of more democratic wood rooted in the solid theoretical 
ground of a socially just society.  
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